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I. INTRODUCTION

As usual, the past year saw numerous appellate cases concerning tort
law. This article will not attempt to review them all. Instead, it will look at
cases from the Supreme Court of Florida and important cases from the
district courts of appeal. The latter will include discussion of cases that
considered novel questions, conflicted with other districts, involved
questions certified as of great public importance, or raised interesting factual
scenarios.
Last year the courts grappled with questions concerning the dangerous
instrumentality doctrine as applied to automobiles, and those cases will be
reviewed in Section II. The courts again considered the coverage and
application of the Medical Malpractice Act to a variety of situations, which
will be discussed in Section III. There are also some cases reviewed in
Section IV that looked at other forms of professional malpractice. Section V
will look at appellate cases that discussed how the element of duty applies to
a variety of factual scenarios. Whether violations of statutes equal a
*
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presumption of negligence was also the subject of a number of decisions,
which are covered in Section VI of this article. The always important
question of how to calculate and apportion damages is the subject of cases
included in Section VII. Section VIm will look at a fraud case involving a
real estate transaction. Section IX includes new standard jury instructions,
which include instructions for some types of tort cases.
II. DANGEROUS INSTRUMENTALITY DOCTRINE (AUTOMOBILES)

The Fourth District Court of Appeal considered the liability of the
lessee of a car involved in an accident while driven by a person without the
consent of the lessee in Barnett v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co.1 In
Barnett, one of the friends of the teenage stepson of the lessee took the keys
to the car and drove it without permission from the lessee or his stepson.2
The court deemed that this was the equivalent of conversion or theft, which
the Supreme Court of Florida had previously
stated would relieve an owner
3
of a car from liability for its use or misuse.
The First District Court of Appeal also looked at the dangerous
instrumentality doctrine in Christenson-Sullinsv. Raymer.4 The trial court
granted summary judgment to the defendant in this case, where the
defendant loaned her car to a former roommate whose boyfriend took the car
without permission and was involved in a collision with one of the
plaintiffs. 5 Because the roommate did not report that the car was missing
when she discovered it, but rather went to a local bar to play darts, the
appellate court felt that summary judgment was improper. The dissent
argued that the affidavits refuting that the defendant knew or consented to
the driver's use of the car warranted a summary judgment, and that an
obligation of an owner or user to report a conversion or theft had not
previously been imposed by Florida courts.7
The Fifth District Court of Appeal considered another dangerous
instrumentality claim in Toombs v. Alamo Rent-A-Car.8 This wrongful death
action involved an automobile accident in which the surviving minor
1.

775 So. 2d 395 (Fla.4th Dist. Ct. App. 2000).

2.

Id. at 396.

3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

Id. at 397 (citing Susco Car Rental Sys. v. Leonard, 112 So. 2d 832 (Fla. 1959)).
765 So. 2d 955 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
Id. at 957.
Id.
Id. at 961-62.
762 So. 2d 1040 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
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children sued Alamo for an accident in which their mother was killed while
their father was driving. 9 The court certified a conflict with the Second
District Court of Appeal in EnterpriseLeasing Co. v. Alley,10 by holding that
the dangerous instrumentality doctrine could not be applied to a situation
where a co-bailee is killed by the negligence of the other co-bailee."
Therefore, it held that the children's cause of action did not survive.12 The
Toombs decision seems to be the better-reasoned one, in part because as the
concurring opinion of Judge Harris notes, in this situation it was the
deceased who entrusted the vehicle to a negligent driver, and therefore, she
was in a better position than the rental car company to make the
determination as to the condition and fitness of the driver.'
The Third District Court of Appeal reviewed the evidence necessary for
a dangerous instrumentality claim in Leal v. Nunez.14 Under the dangerous
instrumentality doctrine, "an owner who gives authority to another to operate
the owner's vehicle, by either express or implied consent, has a nondelegable
obligation to ensure that the vehicle is operated properly."' 15 In this case the
defendant argued that her brother-in-law, who was also her employee, took
her car without permission.' 6 The court held that the trial court's entry of
summary judgment was error regarding the material fact of consent because
of the familial and business relationship between
the driver and owner as
7
well as the behavior of both after the accident.'
m. MEDICAL MALPRACTICE
The application of the Medical Malpractice Act18 to a wrongful death
suit under the Florida Nursing Home Act was considered by the Fourth
District Court of Appeal in Preston v. Health Care & Retirement Corp. of
America.'9 In the case, defendant, Health Care and Retirement Corporation
of America ("Health Care"), argued that the plaintiff's failure to follow the
9.
10.
1999).
11.
12.

Id. at 1041.
728 So. 2d 272 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1999), rev. denied, 741 So. 2d 1135 (Fla.
Toombs, 726 So. 2d at 1042.
Id.

13.
14.
15.
16.
17.

Id. at 1043.
775 So. 2d 974 (Fla.3d Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
Id. at 975. (citing Hertz Corp. v. Jackson, 617 So. 2d 1051 (Fla. 1993)).
Id.
Id. at 975.

18.
19.

FLA. STAT.

§ 766.106 (2001).
785 So. 2d 570 (Fla.4th Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
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Malpractice Act's pre-suit requirements 2° required a dismissal of his
wrongful death action.2 Although the Supreme Court of Florida stated in
Weinstock v. Groth22 that a defendant is entitled to notice under the Act
when it is directly or vicariously liable under the medical negligence
standard of care set forth in section 766.102 of the Florida Statutes, this
court noted that chapter 400 of the Florida Statutes had been amended to
include its own pre-suit investigatory requirement and to limit vicarious
liability for the actions of health care providers. 23 It therefore concluded that
the pre-suit requirements of the nursing home statute, which was a special,
as opposed to a general statute, and which was passed subsequent to the
Malpractice Act, controlled where the allegations concern the deprivation of
a nursing home resident's statutory rights.
The Fifth District Court of Appeal was confronted with another case
trying to decipher the aplication of the pre-suit filing requirements of the
Medical Malpractice Act in Pavolini v. Bird. 26 The claimants in this case
filed a derivative loss of consortium claim in a medical malpractice action
without filing a separate pre-suit notice. 27 The appellate court held that the
spouse or minor child who sought loss of consortium damages was not the
recipient of the medical care or treatment and therefore was not a claimant
under the Act. 28 The dissent by Judge Pleuss argued that this interpretation
placed defendants in the difficult situation of not knowing how to
realistically calculate an appropriate settlement when not all of the plaintiffs
had yet been identified.29
In Bell v. River Memorial,30 the parents of a stillborn baby asked that
the body be returned to them after an autopsy, but the remains were disposed
of
an unknown
The trial
granted
a motionoftothe
dismiss
on
theinground
that themanner.
action violated
the court
pre-suit
requirements
medical

20. § 766.106.
21. Preston, 785 So. 2d at 571.
22. 629 So. 2d 835 (Fla. 1993).
23. Preston,785 So. 2d at 572.
24. Id. The court also noted that the decision was consistent with a case decided by
the Second District Court of Appeal, Integrated Health Care Servs., Inc. v. Lang-Redway, 783
So. 2d 1108 (FIa 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2001). Id.
25. § 766.106.
26. 769 So. 2d 410 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
27. Id at411.
28. Id. at 413.
29. Id. at 414.
30. 778 So. 2d 1030 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
31. Id. at 1031.
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malpractice statute32 and was beyond the statute of limitations for medical
malpractice.33 The court ruled that because the disposal of the child's
remains did not involve diagnosis, treatment, or care nor involved medical
skill or judgment, it was error to apply the medical malpractice statute of
limitations. 34
The applicability of the medical malpractice statutes to a contribution
suit was considered by the First District Court of Appeal in Virginia
Insurance Reciprocal v. Walker.35 In this case, the plaintiffs had been sued
for medical malpractice for failure to diagnose hypothyroidism in an infant. 36
The defendant also treated the child without testing for the condition, but
were not sued by the parents of the child.37 The plaintiffs settled with the
parents and brought this action for contribution from the defendant.38 If the
statute had not been tolled while the plaintiff conducted the pre-suit
screening requirements of the Act, the statute of limitations had expired.39
The appellate court ruled that this was a medical malpractice action subject
to its pre-suit screening procedure because the underlying basis of the
contribution action sounded in medical negligence.40 The court noted that
other jurisdictions have split over this issue and that its decision is in direct
conflict with a decision from the Fourth District Court of Appeal.'
In
considering the policy of the medical malpractice statute to encourage presuit resolution of medical malpractice claims, the First District Court of
Appeal interpretation seems more logical in a suit where the contribution
claim is based upon medical malpractice.

32.
33.

FA. STAT. § 766.101 (2001).

34.

Id.

35.
36.

765 So. 2d 229 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
Id. at 230.

37.
38.

Id.
Id.

Bell, 778 So. 2d at 1034; see also FLA. STAT. § 95.11(4)(b) (2001).

39. Id.
40. Walker, 765 So. 2d at 232.
41. Id. at 234-35 (certifying conflict with Wendell v. Hauser, 726 So. 2d 378 (Fla.
4th Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
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IV. OTHER FORMS OF PROFESSIONAL MALPRACTICE

A. Attorney Malpractice
The Second District Court of Appeal considered the effect of attorney
malpractice on a client in Woodall v. Hillsborough Co. HospitalAuthority.
Woodall's complaint was dismissed for her attorney's failure to comply with
pre-suit discovery requests.43 The appellate court agreed with the trial court
that the attorney's actions amounted to gross negligence, but felt that the
client should not be punished for the misdeeds of her attorney." The court
looked at the following factors in determining whether dismissal was an
appropriate sanction:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)

whether the attorney's disobedience was willful, deliberate,
or contumacious, rather than an act of neglect or
inexperience;
whether the attorney has been previously sanctioned;
whether the client was personally involved in the act of
disobedience;
whether the delay prejudiced the opposing party through
undue expense, loss of evidence, or in some other fashion;
whether the attorney offered reasonable justification for
noncompliance; and
whether the delay created significant problems of judicial
administration.

Only factor five supported the hospital's position in this case.4 The court
noted that sanctions against the attorney would be appropriate. 47
The Fourth District Court of Appeal considered the potential negligence
of two separate law firms in Kates v. Robinson & Spence, Payne, Masington
& Needle, P.A. 4 The first law firm in this case represented the Kates' in a

42.
43.

778 So. 2d 320 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
Id. at 321.

44. Id.
45. Id. at 322 (citing Kozel v. Ostendorf, 629 So. 2d 817, 818 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.
1992)).
46. Id.
47.
48.

Woodall, 778 So. 2d at 322.
786 So. 2d 61 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
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personal injury action.4 9 The plaintiffs entered into a consent judgment that
did not include lessees who might have been liable, but were not joined in
the litigation.50 The Kates subsequently hired Scott Jay to collect on the
judgment. 5' The court held that the Kates had alleged a cause of action
against the first firm for failure to file suit against all of the potentially liable
parties, failure to advise the Kates of the existence of the lessees, and for
advising the Kates that no other parties were liable. 2 However, the court
held that Jay could not be held liable for failure to discover
additional
53
potential defendants when he was hired to collect a judgment.
The Fifth District Court of Appeal considered the perplexing problem
concerning conflicts of interest when an attorney prepares a will for a client
that removes beneficiaries whom he has also represented in Chase v.
Bowen.5 4 In this case, Bowen prepared and revised a will for the plaintiff's
mother.55 At various times, he also represented the plaintiff and the
beneficiaries of the second will who were business associates of the
plaintiff's mother.5 6 The district court held that a lawyer who prepares a will
owes no duty to previous beneficiaries, even
if he represents them in another
57
matter, to oppose the changing of the will.
The dissenting opinion of Judge Sharp asserted that a remand was
appropriate to permit the plaintiff to replead.5 8 Judge Sharp noted that the
plaintiff was disabled and lived with her mother, who supported and cared
for her.59
Therefore, her complete disinheritance in favor of the
beneficiaries, who were friends of the attorney, at least raises the appearance
of potential ethical conflicts.6 Of course, even if the attorney committed an
ethical violation, that does not mean that malpractice has occurred. However,
Judge Sharp noted that Florida recently recognized the tort of intentional
interference with inheritance, and enough facts were alleged in this case to

49.

Id at 62.

50.
51.

Id. at 63.
Id.

52.

Id. at 64.

53.
54.
55.

Kates, 786 So. 2d at 65.
771 So. 2d 1181 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
Id. at 1182.

56. Id.
57.
58.
59.
60.

Id
Id at 1183.
Chase,771 So. 2d at 1183.
Id at 1184.
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raise the possibility that the plaintiff could have potentially stated a claim
under this theory if given another opportunity.61
B.

Other Professions

The Supreme Court of Florida had the occasion to look at accountant
62
malpractice in KPMG Peat Marwick v. National Union FireInsurance Co.
In this case, National Union Fire Insurance Company was the fidelity bond
insurer of Bank Atlantic, for whom KPMG Peat Marwick had conducted
independent audits. 63 National Union filed a negligence suit against KPMG,
but the trial court granted the latter's motion for judgment on the pleadings
because National Union was not entitled to relief as an assignee, contractual
subrogee, or equitable subrogee.6 4 KPMG asserted that Forgione v. Dennis
Pirtle Agency Inc.,65 in which the court prohibited the assignment of a
personal tort in an attorney malpractice case, supported its position. The
court disagreed, stating that legal malpractice claims were not assignable
because of the personal nature of legal services that entailed a confidential,
fiduciary relationship with undivided loyalty to the client. 67 The court
argued that independent auditors have a public responsibility to the
corporation's creditors and stockholders with a total independence from the
client.68 The court declined, however, to decide whether accountant
malpractice claims other than those involving audits could be assigned.69
The First District Court of Appeal looked at a claim of legal
malpractice and illegal attorney's fees in Olmsted v. Emmanuel.70 In this
case, defendant attorneys represented the plaintiff in an employment
discrimination case against Taco Bell under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 19647' and title 42, section 1981 of the United States Code.72 Olmsted, a
white male, argued that he was fired for complaining to superiors about

61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.

Id. at 1186.
765 So. 2d 36 (Fla. 2000).
Id. at 37.
Id.
701 So. 2d 557 (Fla. 1997).
KPMG, 765 So. 2d at 37-38.
Id. at 38.
id.
Id. at 38-39.
783 So. 2d 1122 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3 (2000).
Olmsted, 783 So. 2d at 1124.
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discriminatory practices against blacks at the restaurant.73 After a jury
verdict of damages in excess of $3,000,000, Taco Bell was able to get a
reduction to $300,000 because of limits on Title VII claims found in title 42,
section 1981a(3) of the United States Code.74 The damages would not have
been so limited under the section 1981 claim, but it was not invoked as a
basis for relief in the pretrial stipulation.75 The court ruled that the attorneys
neglected a reasonable duty by failing to invoke the section 1981 claim in
the stipulation.76
The court looked at a judicial estoppel argument made by the plaintiff.77
In appealing the reduction of damages to the United States Court of Appeals
for the Eleventh Circuit,78 the attorneys understandably argued that the
plaintiff had a valid 1981 claim justifying the jury verdict. 79 In the
malpractice case, the attorneys changed their position to argue that the
plaintiffs claim that he would have been successful on the section 1981
claim, had it been preserved, was mere speculation.8 0 The court noted that
judicial estoppel requires that the parties and issues involved must be the
same, which was not true here where the attorneys were not parties in the
appeal of the underlying claim.8' It also upheld the trial court's dismissal of
the malpractice claim.82
What makes this a more difficult question is that arguably the Eleventh
Circuit has not squarely addressed the issue of whether a white person can
succeed on a section 1981 claim in a retaliation case. Although other federal
courts have recognized such a claim,8 3 the court concluded that the Eleventh
Circuit would not, based upon its statements in similar cases.8 The court
also rejected the claim by plaintiff that contingent fee contracts are illegal in
cases involving federal law in federal court. 85 The court concluded the Rules

73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1125-26.
Olmsted, 783 So. 2d at 1126.
Olmsted v. Taco Bell Corp., 141 F.3d 1457 (1Ith Cir. 1998).
Olmsted, 783 So. 2d at 1125.
Id. at 1126.
Id.
Id.
Id at 1127.
Olmsted, 783 So. 2d at 1128.
Id.
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Regulating the FloridaBar86 did not bar contingent fee contracts in this type
of case.87
V. OTHER CASES INVOLVING DUTY

The Supreme Court of Florida examined the application of the Agrarian
rule in relationship to landowner obligations in Whitt v. Silverman,88 a case
where the owners of a gas station were sued by pedestrians struck by a
customer of the station whose view was obstructed because of a stand of
foliage. 89 The Agrarian rule provides that "a landowner owes no duty to
persons.., not on [his] property and therefore.. . is not responsible for any
harm caused... by natural conditions on the land." 9 Despite its seemingly
dated view of the rights of property owners, some courts continue to apply it
in circumstances where conditions on property hinder the view of motorists.
Such courts have argued that motorists are better positioned to prevent
accidents. 91 Even courts that have retained the rule in part, however, have
disagreed about whether the protection should extend to both natural and
artificial conditions or whether the rule should be applicable to property
located in an urban setting. 92 The Restatement (Second) of Torts excuses
liability for rural land, but recognizes a duty for urban property owners
where harm results from failure to exercise reasonable care to prevent
unreasonable risks to persons using adjoining public roads.93
After a long discussion in Whitt concerning the role of foreseeability in
both the duty and proximate cause elements of negligence, the court rejected
a blanket rule that immunized landowners from foreseeable consequences. 94
The court reaffirmed the principles that it announced in McCain v. Florida
Power Corp.95 It remanded the case for a determination as to whether the
landowners' conduct created a foreseeable zone of risk that posed a general
threat of harm toward the patrons of the business and the pedestrians and
motorists who used the abutting streets and sidewalks reasonably affected by

86. See R.REGULATING THE FLA. BAR 4-1.5(f).

87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.

93.
94.
95.

Olnsted, 783 So. 2d at 1129.
788 So. 2d 210 (Fla. 2001).
Id.at 213.
Id.
Id. at 215.
Id.at 215-16.
REsTATEmENr (SEcoND) oF TORTS § 363(2) (1965).
Whitt v. Silverman, 788 So. 2d 210, 218 (Fla. 2001).
593 So. 2d 500 (Fla. 1992).
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the business' traffic. 96 Chief Justice Wells dissented, expressing concern
that the change would result in97extensive exposure of liability to property
owners, including homeowners.
In Sanderson v. Eckerd Corp.,98 the Fifth District Court of Appeal
examined the duty of pharmacists in relation to providing warnings to
customers. 99 There is Florida case law asserting that retail pharmacists have
no duty to warn customers or their physicians of potential adverse drug
reactions.1l° However, the court notes that three other states have applied
the voluntary assumption of a0 duty
doctrine to pharmacists and believes that
1
it could also apply in Florida.
The Fourth District Court of Appeal also considered the duty of a
business that stores keys in a publicly accessible area in Michael & Philip,
Inc. v. Sierra.0 2 The defendant in Sierra was a gym that had a key board
located near the gym's entrance, directly across from the front desk. 0 3 A
patron stole a set of keys from the board and rear-ended the plaintiff's
vehicle, causing injuries.1' 4 The personnel on desk duty did not monitor the
keyboard. 15 The court ruled that this circumstance did not call for an
exception from the general rule that there is no duty to prevent the
misconduct of third persons. 16 It compared the Supreme Court of Florida's
rulings that held owners of vehicles liable for collisions by thieves who stole
vehicles with keys left in the ignition 0 7 or in an open glove compartment. 10 8
The district court felt that the factual dissimilarity was dispositive where the
keys were not left in the car and the gym did own the car.1 9 Judge Klein
dissented, noting that Florida courts have treated automobile negligence
96.

Whitt, 788 So. 2d 222-23.

97.

Id. at 223.

98. 780 So. 2d 930 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
99. Id.
100. Johnson v. Walgreen Co., 675 So. 2d 1036, 1038 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
101. Sanderson, 780 So. 2d at 932 (citing Frye v. Medicare-Glaser Corp., 605 N.E.2d
557 (I1. 1992); Kasin v. Osco Drug Inc., 728 N.E.2d 77 (111. App. 2000); Baker v.- Arbor
Drugs, 544 N.W.2d 727 (Mich. App. 1996); Ferguson v. Williams, 374 S.E.2d 438 (N.C.
App. 1988), appeal after remand,399 S.E.2d 389 (N.C. App. 1991)).
102. 776 So. 2d 294 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
103. Id. at 295.
104. Id. at 295-96.
105. Id at 297.
106. Id. at 298.
107. Vining v. Avis Rent-A-Car Sys., Inc., 354 So. 2d 54, 55 (Fla. 1977).
108. Schwartz v. American Home Assurance Co., 360 So. 2d 383, 384 (Fla. 1978).
109. Sierra,776 So. 2d at 299.
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differently, asserting that whether the theft was foreseeable was a question
for the jury. 110
The Fourth District Court of Appeal reversed a jury verdict in a slip and
fall case in Lester's Diner II, Inc. v. Gilliam,"II where the plaintiff presented
no evidence as to how an alleged oily substance reached the floor or how
long it had been there.1 2 The court noted that "conjecture and pyramiding
inferences" cannot be relied upon to establish the important facts necessary
to show the actual or constructive notice needed by the property owner to
establish negligence. 13
The Fifth District Court of Appeal considered the dut of law enforcement officers pursuing fleeing felons in Bryant v. Beary. 1 4 In this case, a
sheriff's deputy pursued a teen without a license who was driving a car
without permission of the owner and ran through a stop sign.' 1 5 Despite
advising dispatch and his superior that he was terminating the chase, he
continued to pursue the teen. 1 6 The teen ran another stop sign, killing
himself and a motorcyclist.' 7 Although recognizing a duty to bystanders,
the court rejected the argument by the teen's estate that law enforcement
owes a duty, to a violator fleeing the law as a result of his criminal
misconduct.
Although not a case that establishes new law, one with curious facts is
the case of Jackson v. Sweat, 19 in which the First District Court of Appeal
ruled that the plaintiff stated a cause of action where the owner of a store left
it lit and unlocked, creating the appearance that it was open, although he set
the silent burglar alarm.1'0 The police responded and arrested the plaintiff.'12
In Tudor v. Florida Department of Law Enforcement,122 the First
District Court of Appeal found that a plaintiff did not have a cause of action

110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.

Id. at 300.
788 So. 2d 283 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
Id. at 285.
Id. at286.
766 So. 2d 1157 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
Id.
Id. at 1158.
Id.
Id.at 1160.
783 So. 2d 1207 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
Id. at 1207-08.
Id. at 1208.
768 So. 2d 1242 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
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against the Florida Department of Law Enforcement
for failure to comply
123
records.
criminal
expunge
to
with a court order
VI. NEGLIGENCE PRESUMPTIONS

The Supreme Court of Florida clarified the rebuttable presumption of
negligence that attaches to a rear driver in a rear-end collision established in
1
a case from the Second District Court of Appeal in McNulty v. Cusack, "
which it endorsed in Gulle v. Boggs. In Clampitt v. D.J. Spencer Sales,"'
it considered whether a sudden stop, standing alone, is sufficient to
overcome the presumption. 27 The Clampitt case involved a three-vehicle
collision in which the plaintiff was in the middle vehicle.1 8 At trial, the
plaintiff was granted summary judgment on the issue of fault."' The district
by the defendant was
presented
•
130
court reversed, • ruling that the evidence
The court stated that the
sufficient to overcome the presumption.
presumption is grounded in the belief that the rear driver is more likely to
have the evidence of why he was unable to stop' 3' and the policy that such a
driver is charged with being prepared to stop without hitting the vehicle in
front because he is in control of the following distance. 132 The court noted
that it is well settled that an "abrupt stop" by the front vehicle is insufficient
evidence on its own to overcome the presumption. 33 What is needed is a
sudden stop at a time and place where it could not reasonably be expected by
the rear driver. 34 Despite testimony by the defendant that he did not see the
front vehicle activate its turn signal or illuminate its brake lights nor did he
see the plaintiffs vehicle slow or activate her brake lights, the court held
that the trial court properly granted the motion for summary judgment. 35
123. Id. at 1243.
124. 104 So. 2d 785 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1958).
125. 174 So. 2d 26 (Fla. 1965).
126. 786 So. 2d 570 (Fla. 2001).
127. Id.
128. Id. at 571.
129. Id. at 570.
130. Id. at 572.
131. Clampitt,786 So. 2d at 573.
132. Id. at 576. The court also noted that section 316.0895(1) of the FloridaStatutes
requires that "[t]he driver of a motor vehicle shall not follow another vehicle more closely
than is reasonable and prudent.... ." Id. at 575.
133. Id. at 576.
134. Id.
135. Clampitt,786 So. 2d at 575.
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The court noted that the accident took place on a stretch of a two lane
roadway bordered by several commercial establishments, residential
complexes, and Central Florida Junior College. 136 Thus, it apparently
believed that turns and stops should have been anticipated.
The Fourth District Court of Appeal analyzed the applicability of a
statute regulating self-service gasoline stations in Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v.
Forbes.137 In this case, the plaintiff slipped and fell in a puddle of gas
approximately six feet in circumference at a service station. 138 Section
526.141(3) of the FloridaStatutes requires that self-service stations have at
least one attendant on duty whose responsibilities include immediately
handling accidental spills. 139 The court applied the Supreme Court of
Florida case that outlines the doctrine of negligence per se in statutory
violations in deJesus v. Seaboard Coast Line Railroad Co.140 In looking at
the statute as a whole, the court determined that it was meant to protect the
general public, as opposed to a particular class of persons, from injury
caused by fire. 14' This seems to be a reasonable interpretation as evidenced
by references in the statute to flammable and combustible liquids, sources of
ignition, and fire extinguishers. 14 Thus, the court ruled that a violation of
the statute was not negligence per se because the plaintiff did not suffer the
type of injury protected by the statute; and it was one meant to protect43the
general public. Therefore, violation was merely evidence of negligence.1
The Second District Court of Appeal also considered the negligence per
se rule in Golden Shoreline Ltd. Partnershipv. McGowan.14 In this case,
the plaintiff was injured when an elevator malfunctioned. 14 5 Within three
days preceding the incident, problems necessitated the service company
46
being called six times, including three calls on the day of the accident.1
Section 399.02(5)(b) of the Florida Statutes makes an elevator owner
responsible for the safe operation and proper maintenance of its elevators.
The court held that violation of this statute was negligence per se as long as
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.

Id. at 573.
783 So. 2d 1215 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
Id. at 1217.
FLA. STAT. § 526.141(3) (2001).
281 So. 2d 198 (Fla. 1973).
Forbes,783 So. 2d at 1219.
FLA. STAT. § 526.141(1)-(4) (2001).
Forbes,783 So. 2d at 1219-20.
787 So. 2d 109 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
Id. at 110.
Id.
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plaintiff could demonstrate that the defendants violated their duty to properly
maintain the elevator.147
The Fifth District Court of Appeal considered the releyance of the
unattended motor vehicle statute to a car accident in which the thief is killed
in Graham v. Stephens.!" Section 316.1975(1) of the Florida Statutes
makes it a noncriminal traffic violation to leave a motor vehicle without
stopping the engine, locking the ignition, and removing the key. In this case,
the deceased, a seventeen-year-old girl, took a car in which the key was left
in the ignition and let a thirteen-year-old boy drive it. 149 The boy lost control
of the vehicle, killing the girl and another passenger.'-5° The court ruled that
the person who stole the vehicle could not be considered part of the class
protected by the statute.' 5 ' The court noted that the duty arising from this
the public who use the highways and are
statute extends to members of 152
vehicles.
stolen
these
by
injured
VII. DAMAGES
The Supreme Court of Florida considered the noneconomic damages
limit in the medical malpractice statute in St. Mary's Hospital, Inc. v.
Phillipe153 This appeal involved a consolidation of two cases with similar
legal issues.'- 4 In both cases, the claimants were awarded noneconomic
damages that totaled more than $250,000.15 First, the court rejected the
argument of appellants that section 766.212(2) of the Medical Malpractice
Act's limitation on the ability to stay the execution of an arbitration award
unconstitutionally encroached on the court's rule making authority, which
provides for an automatic stay of a money judgment under rule 9.310(b) of
the FloridaRules ofAppellate Procedure.'5 The court held that the parties'

147. Il
148. 779 So. 2d 649 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
149. Id at 650.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id at 651 (citing Vining v. Avis Rent-A-Car Sys., Inc., 354 So. 2d 54 (Fla.

1977)).
153. 769 So. 2d 961 (FIa. 2000).
154. St. Mary's Hosp., Inc. v. Phillipe, 699 So. 2d 1017 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1997);
Franzen v. Mogler, 699 So. 2d 1026 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
155. Phillipe, 769 So. 2d at 963-64.
156. Phillipe, 699 So. 2d at 1019.
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also entailed consent to the
voluntary participation in the arbitration process
157
limited stay and review procedures of the Act.
Next the court considered the application of the Act's limit of $250,000
in noneconomic damages per incident. 18 The court first noted that this
provision was neither clear nor unambiguous.159 It held that the cap was a
limit on each individual claimant, but did not prevent the total noneconomic
damages of all of the claimants in a particular case from exceeding
$250,000.'60 The majority concluded that the contrary interpretation would
The court also rejected the argument
present equal protection problems.
that the economic damages available in medical negligence cases that result
in death are limited by the Wrongful Death Act, which provides a narrower
range of damages. 62 Justice Anstead dissented, arguing that the plain
language of the statute and the court's prior interpretation of the statute in
University of Miami v. Echarte163 required that the cap of $250,000 be
applied to each incident of medical malpractice.164
The question of sovereign immunity was considered in Cunningham v.
66
City of Dania,165 by the Fourth District Court of Appeal.
This case
167
A wrongful death
involved the fatal shooting of a minor in a public park.
action was commenced against the City of Dania and the Broward County
The park in which the drive-by shooting occurred was the
Sheriff.
location of at least seven shootings over eight years as well as a "high
incidence of gang related activity, assault, battery, sexual battery, robbery,
illegal possession of various weapons, and drug-related offenses."
In determining the applicability of governmental tort liability, the court
looked at the controlling Supreme Court of Florida precedent, Trianon Park
Condominium Ass'n v. City of Hialeah,17 which established that there must
157. Phillipe,769 So. 2d at 967.
158. Id. Section 766.207(7)(b) of the Florida Statutes provides: "[n]oneconomic
damages shall be limited to a maximum of $250,000 per incident."
159. Phillipe,769 So. 2d at 968.
160. Id.at 971.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 973.
163. 618 So. 2d 189 (Fla. 1993).
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.

Phillipe, 769 So. 2d at 974.
771 So. 2d 12 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
Id.
Id. at 13.
Id.
Id.
468 So. 2d 912 (Fla. 1985).
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be "an underlying common law or statutory duty of care." 17' The district
court held that the City had a duty to maintain and operate the park, which
would include the duty to protect invitees from reasonably foreseeable
criminal acts on the premises. 172 Because of the history of violent criminal
acts, the court felt that a duty of care could arise on behalf of the City, but
not on behalf of the Sheriff because a law enforcement
officer's duty is to
13
the public as a whole as opposed to an individual. 7
In Value Rent-A-Car, Inc. v. Grace,'74 the Second District Court of
Appeal was asked to apply the parental immunity doctrine in an indemnity
action by the plaintiff rental car company. 75 In this action, the wife and
child of the driver of the rental car sued Value, which sought indemnity from
Mr. Grace pursuant to contractual and common law theories.' 76 Mr. Grace
filed an affirmative defense arguing that the parental immunity doctrine
177
prevented recovery by his minor child or persons claiming on his behalf.
The court noted that the Supreme Court of Florida has held that parents are
immune from suits by their children except to the extent of applicable
liability coverage. 78 The court rejected the argument by the defendant that
the plaintiff was required to plead the existence of liability coverage in its
complaint. 79 The court argued that plaintiffs are not generally required to
plead facts negating every potential affirmative defense that may be
raised. 8 °
Of perhaps more interest in this case is the concern raised by acting
Chief Judge Altenbemd's concurring opinion.' 81 In Altenbernd's concurring
opinion, the judge notes that it is an unresolved issue as to whether family
immunity should bar an indemnity claim brought by a party who is only
vicariously liable for the damages.' 82 As noted, the family immunity
doctrine is often asserted as a protection of family resources, but a payment
by a vicariously liable party in a case like this one would actually increase
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
1063 (Fla.
179.

Id. at 917.
Cunningham,771 So. 2d at 14.
U at 16.
26 Fla. L. Weekly D737 (2d Dist. Ct. App. Mar. 14,2001).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. (citing Ard v. Ard, 414 So. 2d 1066 (Fla. 1982); Joseph v. Quest, 414 So. 2d
1982)).
Grace, 26 Fla. L. Weekly at D737.

180. Id.

181. Id
182. Id.
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family resources.1 83 Thus, allowing family immunity in this type of case
would arguably turn such defendants into insurers with no protection in
family claims without advancing the major justification for parental
immunity. 18 One hopes that this interesting policy question will be resolved
in the future in this case or a similar one where the question is at issue.
The Fifth District Court of Apeal also considered an apportionment of
damages issue in Doig v. Chester.18 In Doig, the plaintiff sued Dr. Doig and
Halifax Hospital for medical malpractice. 18 6 Halifax settled for $150,000
during pre-suit proceedings, and the plaintiff recovered $507,321 through
87
arbitration with Doig, of which $250,000 was for non economic damages.1
The issue was "whether the Halifax recovery should be offset against the
Doig award.' 88 The plaintiff did not want the per-incident limit on total
noneconomic damages in the medical malpractice statute' 89 to limit her total
non economic damages from the two defendants. 19° The appellate court held
that the plaintiff was entitled to only $250,000 in total noneconomic
damages.191 It did however certify the following question to the Supreme
Court of Florida as one of great public importance: "IS IT APPROPRIATE
TO SETOFF AGAINST THE NON ECONOMIC DAMAGES PORTION
OF AN AWARD AGAINST ONE TORTFEASOR IN AN ARBITRATION
OF A MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ACTION THE AMOUNT RECOVERED FROM SETTLEMENT FROM ANOTHER192RESPONSIBLE FOR THE
SAME INCIDENT CAUSING THE INJURY?'
In the case of Letzter v. Cephas,193 the Fourth District Court of Appeal
has certified two questions to the Supreme Court of Florida: 1) "Has the
doctrine of Stuart v. Hertz194 been abrogated by the Tort Reform and
Insurance Act of 1986, Chapter 86-160, Laws of Florida?;" and 2) "Does
Stuart v. Hertz apply when the initial cause of action is one in medical

183.
184.
185.
(2001).
186.
187.
188.

Id. at D738.
Grace,26 Fla. L. Weekly at D738.
776 So. 2d 1043 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2001); see also FLA. STAT. § 766.207

Id. at 1044.
Id.
Id.
189. FLA. STAT. § 766.207(7)(h) (2000).

190.
191.
192.
193.
194.

Doig, 776 So. 2d at 1044.
Id. at 1045.
Id.at 1047.
Letzter v. Cephas, 792 So. 2d 481 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
351 So. 2d 703 (Fla. 1977).
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malpractice and both the initial and subsequent tortfeasors are sued in the
same action'?"' 95
In Letzter, Mr. Cephas, a diabetic, consulted Dr. Letzter concerning a
wound on the little toe of his right foot.196 It was alleged that Letzter was
negligent in not performing distal bypass surgery in a timely manner. 197
Because of continuing pain in his foot, the plaintiff sought treatment at an
emergency room in a nearby hospital where Dr. Armand performed a forefoot amputation and a femoral-to-popliteal artery bypass on Cephas' right
leg. 9s Experts testified that Armand's actions also were negligent in some
2 °
respects. 99 Eventually Cephas required a below the knee amputation. 0
The trial court agreed to give the Stuart v. Hertz instruction. The instruction
generally states that one who negligently causes another's personal injuries
is also liable as a proximate cause of damages suffered when the injured
party exercises reasonable care in securing the services of a competent
physician or surgeon, but suffers aggravation or increased ijury by the
negligence, mistake, or lack of skill of the physician or surgeon.
Dr. Letzter argued that the instruction was erroneous because he and
Dr. Armand were joint tortfeasors. 202 Although it would not have been
appropriate to present such an instruction in that case, the court ruled that
whether the doctors were joint tortfeasors was a jury question from which
the evidence could support either conclusion. 2 3 However, because the jury
found that Dr. Armand was the legal cause of damage, but allocated fault
between the two medical practitioners, the court ruled that the jury must
have rejected joint liability, and therefore held that the trial judge's refusal to
apportion non-economic damages was error under section 768.81 of the
Florida Statutes.204 As noted in the concurring opinion of Judge Klein,
chapter 86-160 of the Tort Reform and Insurance Act of 1986 provides that
courts shall enter judgments against parties based upon each party's

195. Letzter, 792 So. 2d at 488.
196. Id. at 484.

197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Letzter, 792 So. 2d at 485.

201.
202.
203.
204.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 486.
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liability. 2 0 5
percentage of fault and not on the basis of joint and several
6
Thus, the court questions whether Stuart is still good law.2
The Fourth District Court of Appeal considered the applicability of
drunk driving by a nonparty in a comparative negligence context in Hyundai
Motor Co. v. Ferayorni.2°7 In this case, the deceased was killed in a car
accident in which she was improperly wearing her shoulder harness under
her arm.2°8 Her death was due to internal injuries caused by the underarm
use of the seatbelt. 20 9 Two trials ensued in which, in addition to other
claims, the plaintiff argued that Hyundai provided inadequate warnings
about improperly using the seatbelt in this manner.210 The court ruled that
the negligence of the drunk driver who caused the accident should have been
considered in apportioning fault even though the drunk driver was not a
defendant in this action. 211 This decision puts the court in conflict with the
Third District Court of Appeal, which in Nash v. General Motors Corp.2t 2
held that drunk driving was an intentional tort and thus, should not be
considered.2 13
The First District Court of Appeal considered the effects of a release
signed pursuant to a settlement in a damages action against a jointly liable
defendant in Schnepel v. Gouty.2 14 In Schnepel, plaintiff Gouty was injured
by a bullet fired from Schnepel's gun.21 5 Gout sued Schnepel and the gun
manufacturer, Glock, with whom he settled for $137,500 before trial. 21 6 At
trial, the jury found that the plaintiff suffered $250,000 damages, of which
half were economic, and that Schnepel, but not Glock, was at fault. 21 7 The
court noted that the jurisdictions are split as to whether a release of one
person from liability in tort is affected by the fact that the person was not in

205. Letzter, 792 So. 2d at 488.
206. Id. Judge Klein notes some courts have held the Act only applies to joint tortfeasors and is therefore not applicable to cases where there are sequential, but not joint,
tortfeasors. See, e.g., Beverly Enters. Fla., Inc. v. McVey, 739 So. 2d 646 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct.
App. 1999); Ass'n for Retarded Citizens-Volusia, Inc. v. Fletcher, 741 So. 2d 520 (Fla. 5th
Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
207. 26 Fla. L. Weekly D1983 (4th Dist. Ct. App. Aug. 15, 2001).
208. Id.
209. Id.

210. Id.
211. Id. at D1985.

212 734 So. 2d 437, 440-41 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
213. Id.
214. 766 So. 2d 418 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
215. Id. at 419.

216. Id.
217. Id. at 420.

https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol26/iss1/7

20

Adams, Jr.: Tort Law

2001]

Adams

fact liable. 218 The court decided that Florida's setoff statutes 219 required a
setoff in this case. 220 However, the court certified the following question as
one of great public importance:
Where the plaintiff has delivered a written release or covenant not
to sue to a settling defendant allegedly jointly and severally liable
for economic damages, should the settlement proceeds. apportionable to economic damages be set off against any award for
economic damages even if the settling defendant is not found
liable? 1
Judge Van Nortwick dissented on the interpretation of the setoff
statutes by the majority. 222 Judge Nortwick reasoned that the statutes do
apply to economic damages where the parties are jointly and severally liable,
but that they were not applicable here, where Schnepel was found to be
100% at fault.m On policy grounds, the dissent argues that if a party is to
benefit from such a settlement, it should be the injured party as opposed to
the tortfeasor, and that the majority's construction of the statute discourages
settlements with less than all of the defendants with potential joint and
several liability. 224
In Somberg v. FloridaConvalescent Centers, Inc.,22 5 the Third District
Court of Appeal reviewed the issue of survival of pre-death pain and
suffering in a nursing home statutory violation case."' The FloridaStatutes
require that nursing home residents "receive adequate and appropriate health
care9227 and creates a private right of action for deprivation of the statutory
rights of nursing home residents. 22 The nursing home was granted summary
judgment pursuant to its argument that the Wrongful Death Act excludes
claims for personal injuries that result in death.229 In an area in which the

218. Id. at 420-23 (citing Goldsen v. Simpson, 783 So. 2d 46 (Ala. Civ. App. 2000)).
219. FLA. STAT. §§ 46.015(2), 768.041(2) (2000).
220. Schnepel, 766 So. 2d at 423.
221. Id. at 419.

222 Id. at 424.
223. Id. at 425.

224. Id.
225. 779 So. 2d 667 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
226. Id. at 668.
227. FLA. STAT. § 400.022(1)(1) (2001).

228. § 400.023(1).
229. § 768.20.
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districts are divided, the court concluded that the claim survives 23° because
the nursing home statute provides that suits claiming
1 infringements or
deprivations of rights survive the death of the resident.2
The Third District Court of Appeal considered the application of the
offer of judgment statute to personal injury protection (PIP) actions in U.S.
Security Insurance Co. v. Cahuasqui.232 The plaintiff refused an offer of
judgment from U.S. Security Insurance.2 33 The jury found that the plaintiff
was not entitled to recovery.2 34 Subsequently, U.S. Security filed for
attorneys' fees under the offer of judgment statute, section 768.79 of the
Florida Statutes.235 The plaintiff argued that this was not permissible
236
because of the attorney's fees section of the PIP statute,
which only
provides for attorneys' fees for insureds or beneficiaries.2 37 The appellate
court held that the offer of judgment statute applied to all civil actions and
did not conflict with the PIP statute.238 It would appear from looking at the
language of the latter statute, that the dissent by Judge Fletcher provides the
better interpretation of that statute under normal statutory construction of
specific statutes governing over more general ones.239
The Fifth District Court of Appeal considered the relationship of the
dangerous instrumentality doctrine and indemnity theory in Hertz Corp. v.
Rhode Island Hospitalm Both doctrines establish vicarious liability. In
this case, the former creates vicarious liability for automobile lessors and the
latter under the doctrine of respondeat superior.4 Citing Hertz Corp. v.
Ralph M. Parsons, Co.,242 the court argued that the negligence of the driver
and its employer is primary as compared to the secondary negligence of the
owner, and therefore an indemnification action by the latter is allowed

230. Somberg, 779 So. 2d at 668; accord Beverly Enters. Fla., Inc. v. Spilman, 661 So.
2d 867 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1995); contra First Healthcare Corp. v. Hamilton, 740 So. 2d
1189 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
231. FLA. STAT. § 400.023(1) (2001).
232. 760 So. 2d 1101 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
233. Id. at 1103-04.
234. Id.
235. Id. at 1104.
236. FIA. STAT. § 627.428 (2001).
237. Cahuasqui,760 So. 2d at 1104.
238. Id.
239. Id. at 1108.
240. 784 So. 2d 506 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
241 Id. at 507.
242. 419 F.2d 783 (5th Cir. 1969).
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247

against an employer of an employee driving a rental car in the course and
scope of employment. 243

VII. FRAUD
A fraud claim was considered by the Fourth District Court of Appeal in
Azam v. M1I Schottenstein Homes, Inc.2M The Azam case dealt with a claim
by the plaintiff that defendant developer falsely claimed that a site where a
school was to be built was going to be a permanent natural preserve.2 45 The
defendant claimed that an action for fraud in inducement or negligence
cannot exist in the sale of a home where the information relied upon is a
matter of public record. 6 The Azam court disagreed with the defendant,
holding that the statements concerning public records could form the basis of
a fraud action as a question of fact.247
IX. JURY INSTRUCTIONS

The Supreme Court of Florida also published new standard jury
instructions, some of which relate to tort cases.2" These include new
instructions concerning parental loss of filial consortium. 24 9 Included in the
new instructions are explanations of expenses for care and treatment, loss of
services and earnings, as well as loss of companionship, society, love,
affection, and solace. 250 In addition, the instructions include amendments to
the instructions on negligent misrepresentation claims. 25' These include
instructions concerning comparative negligence 252 as recognized by
the
253
Supreme Court of Florida in Gilchrist Timber Co. v. ITT Rayonier,Inc.

243.
244.
245.
246
1999)).

Hertz, 784 So. 2d at 507-08.
761 So. 2d 1195 (Ha. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
Id. at 1195-96.
Id. at 1196 (citing Pressman v. Wolf, 732 So. 2d 356 (Ha. 3d Dist. Ct. App.

247. Id.
248. Standard Jury Instructions-Civil Cases, 777 So. 2d 378 (Fla. 2000).
249. Id. at 379.
250. Id. at 380.

251. Id. at 380-82.
252. Id. at 383.
253. 696 So. 2d 334 (Fla. 1997).
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X. CONCLUSION

As can be seen, Florida appellate courts have again been busy during
the past year in clarifying the constantly evolving area of tort law. Courts
have attempted to clarify the breadth of the dangerous instrumentality
doctrine as applied to automobiles and the coverage of the Medical
Malpractice Act. They have also revisited the persistent problems of the
existence of legal duties, the application of the negligence per se doctrine,
and the calculation of damages. Although some points have been clarified,
new questions have been raised in other areas. Perhaps some of these new
questions will be answered in the next year.
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